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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, j 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
vs. : 
ALLEN DWAINE OLSEN, MICHAEL : 
PAYNE WARNICK and DONALD RAY : 
HATCH, ; 
Defendants-Appellants : 
: Case No. 880269-CA 
: Category No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(e) , Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended, 1987-88. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
Defendants appeal their conviction for the Third Degree 
Felony Theft, Section 76-6-404 and Section 76-2-412, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1987-88. Defendants entered a plea of not guilty to 
the charges and were found guilty by a jury on the 22nd day of 
January, 1988. A Notice of Appeal was filed on April 13, 1988. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. DEFENDANT'S WERE DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BY THE FAILURE OF 
THE STATE TO REVEAL ORAL STATEMENTS OF DEFENDANTS IN RESPONSE TO 
THE DISCOVERY REQUESTS OF THE CO-DEFENDANTS. 
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY ALLOWING TESTIMONY OF A 
WITNESS NOT REVEALED BY THE STATE IN RESPONSE TO DISCOVERY 
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REQUESTS. 
III. THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING AN INSTRUCTION CONCERNING A 
CRIME WITH WHICH THE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT CHARGED. 
IV. THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT BY REMARKS DURING 
OPENING STATEMENT WHICH REFERRED TO EVIDENCE WHICH WAS 
INADMISSABLE. 
V. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE VERDICT. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The defendants were stopped by the Wayne County Sheriff as 
they were leaving the Glen Canyon National Recreation Area in a 
vehicle which contained seven head of cattle. The cattle in the 
possession of the defendants were neither branded, earmarked, nor 
contained any other evidence of being domesticated. (T-73-74) 
The defendants found the animals on open range located in the 
Glen Canyon National Recreation Area and had assumed them to be 
wild animals based upon information from third parties and their 
observations of the nature of the animals and lack of any 
indication of domestication. Defendants believed they had the 
right to obtain the wild animals for their own use and benefit 
and were not aware of any claim of ownership to the animals. The 
loading and transport of the animals ocurred during daylight 
hours and in a vehicle which was open to view.(T. 157-167) 
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The Sheriff of Wayne County, together with armed deputies, 
stopped the vehicle of the defendants and took the defendants 
into custody. The defendants were subsequently Jointly charged 
with the theft of livestock on a single Information. 
At arraignment, defendants entered pleas of not guilty. At 
that time, counsel for defendant Hatch filed a Request for 
Discovery as did counsel for defendants Olsen and Warwick. The 
motions for discovery requested "any written or recorded 
statements by the defendant or any co-defendants." The requests 
of the defendants also requested a list of witnesses the 
plaintiff intended to call and a summary of their expected 
testimony. 
The response of the State to the requests for statements was 
that the State "had no knowledge of any written or recorded 
statements of the Defendants." As to the request for witnesses, 
the State identified several and indicated that future witnesses 
may be called. The State filed supplemental responses to update 
the information as to additional witnesses which may by called. 
Prior to trial of the matter, a hearing was held on a Motion to 
Suppress Evidence and a motion to require the identity of an 
alleged informant. During that hearing from the testimony of the 
Wayne County Sheriff, evidence of an oral statement of defendant 
Hatch to the effect that he didn't know who the cows belonged to 
was mentioned by the sheriff. Defense counsel expressed concern 
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at not having been given notice of that statement and asked about 
any other statements. They were informed there were no other 
statements. 
Trial of the case was held on the 21st day of January, 1988, 
at Loa, Utah. At the time of the trial during the opening 
statement of the prosecutor, the prosecutor indicated to the jury 
that during the arrest and transportation of the defendants, one 
of the defendants, Warwick, had made the statement "I am guilty 
and I know it." (T.15) Immediately upon hearing the statement, 
counsel for defendants requested a bench conference and expressed 
surprise and concern over the failure of the State to notify 
defendants that there were alleged to have been statements of an 
inculpatory nature made to law enforcement officers. The 
prosecutor took the position that only written or recorded 
statements were required to be provided. The court advised the 
prosecutor not to comment any further on statements of defendants 
and deferred ruling on the admissibility of the statements until 
the time they would be offered. (T.16) 
During the course of the trial, the State attempted to 
introduce statements of defendants Warwick and Olsen allegedly 
made to police officers after Miranda warnings but not recorded 
or written. (T. 50)During argument based upon U.S. v. Bruton, 391 
U.S. 123, the prosecutor indicated that there were two more 
statements allegedly made to Officer Brinkerhoff which were in 
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the nature of admissions which had not been revealed to defense. 
The trial court ruled that under the Bruton ruling, the State 
would not be allowed to use the statements in their case in 
chief.(T.50) During the testimony of Officer Brinkerhoff, the 
prosecutor again attempted to introduce oral statements of one of 
the defendants, Olsen, claiming that the defendant had said "I 
didn't think we'd get caught." The court ruled on the basis of 
Bruton, that the statements were not admissible. (T.91) However, 
the court indicated that if the defendants testified, the 
statements could be used during rebuttal. 
Based upon the court's ruling, defendants Warwick and Olsen 
did not testify, but defendant Hatch did testify. Following 
defendant Hatch's testimony, the State called Hatch's former wife 
as a witness. Counsel for defendants objected upon the grounds 
that she had not been identified as a witness in response to the 
discovery requests of the defendants. The prosecutor admitted he 
was aware of the witness but wasn't sure whether or not he was 
going to call her. The court overruled defendants objections to 
her testimony and allowed her to testify. (T.187) After 
sustaining counsels objections to conversations made during the 
course of the marriage, the court did allow the prosecution to 
ask the witness whether or not she had had conversations with 
defendant Hatch concerning the taking of cattle and allowed her 
answer "Yes" to stand over defendants' objections. (T.192) 
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At the close of the case, counsel took exceptions to certain 
of the jury instructions given by the court and objected to the 
failure of the court to give requested instructions of 
defendants. One of the instructions given by the court, 
Instruction No. 15, instructed the jury that it was a crime to 
transport cattle without brands or certificates of ownership. 
Defendants objected on the basis that defendants had not been 
charged with that violation and that the giving of the 
instruction would cause the jury to convict the defendants 
because they violated that statute instead of the one with which 
they were charged. Counsel further argued that it was not a 
lesser included charge of the crime of theft of livestock. After 
the court had indicated he was going to give the instruction over 
the objections of defendants, defendants then requested a lesser 
included instruction of the crime of transporting cattle without 
a brand or certificate of ownership. (T.206-209) 
The jury retired to deliberate approximately 4:45 p.m. and 
returned with a verdict of guilty as charged in the case of each 
of the defendants at 8:20 p.m. From that verdict, the defendants 
filed an appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The defendants submitted discovery requests pursuant to 
U.C.A. 77-35-l6(a). The State responded to the requests. One of 
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the requests was for statements of the defendants. The State 
failed to inform the joint defendants that it alleged to have 
oral statements made to law enforcement officers and others which 
were inculpatory. Over objection of the defendants, the court 
ruled that the State would be able to introduce the statements in 
the event the declarants or any of them testified. Such a ruling 
constituted reversible error. 
Also, in requests for discovery, the State failed to give 
notice of a witness. The court allowed the witness to testify 
against the defendants despite the objection of counsel for 
defendants and the failure of the State to identify the 
individual as a potential witness. 
The court committed reversible error by giving an 
instruction concerning prohibited conduct of which the defendants 
were not charged. The giving of the instruction was improper and 
could only increase the chances that the defendants would be 
convicted of conduct with which they were not charged. 
The prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by stating 
in his opening statement the alleged admission of one of the 
defendants. The admission was not allowed in evidence, yet the 
jurors were made aware of it by the prosecutor. The prosecutor 
should have known that in a joint trial the statements of co-
defendants are not admissible against other defendants. 
The evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. There 
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was not any evidence introduced at trial upon which the jury 
could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants had the 
intent to deprive the owner of the cattle. The cattle were on a 
public recreation area, appeared to be wild showing no signs of 
domestication, no brands or markings and no sign of any human 
ownership. The defendants had the right to assume that the owner 
would abide by the state laws requiring branding of animals upon 
the open range. 
POINT I 
DEFENDANTS WERE DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BY THE FAILURE OF THE STATE 
TO REVEAL ORAL STATEMENTS OF DEFENDANTS IN RESPONSE TO THE 
DISCOVERY REQUESTS OF THE CO-DEFENDANTS. 
The three defendants in this matter were jointly charged in 
a single Information alleging theft of livestock. At the time of 
the arraignment of the defendants, the defendants submitted 
discovery requests to the State in accordance with the provisions 
of Utah Code Ann. 77-35-16. Both the requests of defendant Hatch 
and the requests of defendants Warwick and Olsen requested the 
State to produce "any written or recorded statements of the 
defendant or any co-defendants." At the time of trial, the 
prosecutor referred to one of the alleged admissions of the 
defendant Warwick. Although the court upon objection from 
defense counsel restrained further comment or reference to any 
admissions during opening statements, the jury had already heard 
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the damaging statement. During the course of the trial, the 
State attempted to introduce evidence of oral admissions of the 
individual defendants. Although the court did not allow the 
admission of the statements in the case in chief of the State, 
the court did rule that the statements could be used in rebuttal 
if the defendants chose to testify. Two of the defendants, 
Warwick and Olsen, were prevented from testifying as a result of 
the court's ruling. 
In State v. Carter, 707 P2d 656, the Utah Supreme Court 
discussed the nature and extent of the duty of the prosecutor to 
disclose inculpatory information to defense. At 707 P2d 662, the 
court stated: 
...As we have several times noted, a criminal proceeding 
is more than an adversarial contest between two competing 
sides. It is a search for truth upon which a just judgment 
may be predicated. When a request or an order for discovery 
is made pursuant to 77-35-l6(a), a prosecutor must comply. 
To meet basic standards of fairness and to ensure that 
a trial is a real quest for truth and not simply a contest 
between the parties to win, a defendant's request for 
information which has been voluntarily compiled with, or 
a court order of discovery must be deemed to be a contin-
uing request. And even though there is no court-ordered 
disclosure, a prosecutor's failure to disclose newly 
discovered inculpatory information which falls within 
the ambit of 77-35-l6(a) after the prosecution has 
made a voluntary disclosure of evidence might so mis-
lead defendant as to cause prejudicial error. 
Further, in State v. Knight, 734 P2d 913, the court found that 
the duty to respond to requested information which falls within 
the "same specification, it has to produce the later-acquired 
material." 734 P2d at 917. The Knight case also held that the 
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prosecutor must supply information sought which may not be within 
his own file but is known to others involved in the 
investigation. 
The State in explanation of the failure to provide 
information of oral admissions of the defendants to the defense 
counsel, simply argued that the requests had only been for 
written or recorded statements and that there were none of the 
statements which were written or recorded. Although the trial 
court disagreed with that argument and agreed with the position 
of the defendants that the introduction of the admissions would 
be unfair in light of defense attempts to discover admissions 
prior to trial(T.91 ) , the court did indicate that if the 
defendants took the stand, the undisclosed statements could be 
used in rebuttal. 
Had the defendants known that there were admissions which 
co-defendants had been alleged to have made, counsel could have 
requested severance of trials. In the case of Warwick and Olsen, 
a conflict was immediately presented by the attempt to introduce 
evidence which would, under the ruling of the court, only be 
introduced if the declarant testified. Counsel representing 
Warwick and Olsen, Mr. Means, was put in an untenable position in 
trying to serve the interests of the two individuals. Obviously, 
if his advice to Warwick was to testify, then the admission of 
Warwick's alleged admission would affect Olsen. Likewise, in the 
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case of the defendant Hatch, the fact that his co-defendants 
chose not to take the stand in their defense prejudiced his case, 
especially in light of the statements referring to Warwick's 
alleged admission made by the prosecutor in his opening 
statement. 
Further, where the defendants denied making any such 
statements, had the alleged statements been revealed earlier, 
counsel for the defendants would have had the opportunity to 
investigate the circumstances under which they were alleged to 
have been made and could have moved for their suppression at the 
time of the suppression hearing heard prior to trial. 
As set forth above, the obvious effect of the failure to 
disclose the claim of admissions was to unduly prejudice the 
defendants. The remedy sought by defendants, prohibiting the 
introduction of the statements, is one of the remedies available 
under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 77-35-l6(g). The court in 
Knight, 734 P2d at 918 stated: 
On the other hand, if the trial judge denies the 
relief requested under Rule 16(g), that denial 
may constitute an abuse of discretion warranting 
a reversal. An abuse of discretion occurs when, 
taking into account any remedial measures ordered 
by the trial court, the prejudice to the defendant 
still satisfies the standard for reversible error 
set forth in Rule 30, and the remedial measures 
requested but refused would have obviated this 
prejudice. 
In the present case, the ruling to allow the statements as 
rebuttal evidence did not obviate the prejudice to the defendants 
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as se t for th above. The remedy requested by the defendants of 
p r o h i b i t i n g use of the s t a t e m e n t s would have removed t h a t 
p re jud ice . 
In evaluating Rule 30 application to cases such as this one 
in which a review of the record would not provide much 
assistance, Knignt held that the burden is upon the State to show 
that the error did not unfairly prejudice the defendants. At 734 
P2d 920, the court stated: 
...However, when, as here, the error consists of the 
prosecution1s failure to provide a defendant with 
inculpatory evidence, the record does not provide much 
assistance in discovering the nature or magnitude of 
the resulting prejudice to the defense. The record 
cannot reveal how knowledge of this evidence would 
have affected defense counsel, either in preparing 
for trial or in presenting the case to the jury. 
In the present case, the defendants1 convictions should be 
reversed for the failure of the State to provide adequate 
discovery. 
POINT II 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERROR BY ALLOWING TESTIMONY OF A WITNESS 
NOT REVEALED BY THE STATE IN RESPONSE TO DISCOVERY REQUESTS. 
One of the requests for discovery made by the defendants 
was for a listing of names and addresses of witnesses the State 
intended to call to testify. The prosecutor gave an initial 
response and then two supplemental responses listing probable 
witnesses. At the trial, the State called as a rebuttal witness, 
the ex-wife of defendant Hatch. The prosecutor attempted to 
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introduce testimony of conversations between the defendant and 
the witness which occurred during the marriage. The nature of 
the testimony would have constituted marital communications and 
the trial court upheld defendant's objection to the admission of 
that testimony although the judge allowed the witness to testify 
that she had had conversations with defendant Hatch concerning 
the "taking of cattle". These statements were not furnished to 
the defendants, nor was the fact that the witness was going to be 
a probable witness for the State. The prosecutor admitted that 
he was aware of the witness but argued he did not have to reveal 
her as a witness since he had only used her as a rebuttal 
witness. 
Defendants argue that the State cannot comply with the 
purpose of Section 77-35-l6(a) by failing to list a witness known 
to the prosecution at the outset of the case by claiming 
exemption from discovery on the basis that she was only to be a 
rebuttal witness. The attempt to use the witness was for the 
purpose of introducing statements adverse to the interest of one 
of the defendants. Again, had the co-defendants been aware of 
the State's intent to call the witness, they may have sought 
separate trials. Defense counsel may have been able to obtain 
evidence to rebut or discredit the testimony of the witness. As 
set forth above, the cases cited therein apply to this situation 
and the court committed reversible error by allowing this witness 
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to testify over the objections of defense counsel. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING AN INSTRUCTION CONCERNING A CRIME 
WITH WHICH THE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT CHARGED. 
In Instruction No. 15 the court instructed the jurors as 
follows: 
No person may transport any cattle without having 
an official state brand certificate or other proof of 
ownership in his possession. Each person transporting 
livestock for another person shall have a transit per-
mit signed by the owner or the ownerTs authorized 
agent, specifying the name of the person driving the 
vehicle, date of transportation, place or origin or 
loading, destination, date of issuance, and number 
of head being transported. 
Defense counsel took exception to the above stated instruction 
upon the grounds that it alleged unlawful conduct of the 
defendants with which they had not been charged, had not been 
given notice, and was not a lesser included offense within the 
crime theft with which the defendants were charged. The 
instruction was a recitation of Section 4-24-17 of the Utah Code 
which prohibited the conduct described therein. The giving of an 
instruction concerning a separate type of prohibited conduct 
without first charging the defendants violates the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. 77-35-4 requiring an information or indictment, 
77-35-5, providing the prosecution of any offense by commenced by 
filing information or indictment, 77-35-7 providing for 
appearance before a magistrate, receive notice of rights 
regarding the alleged crimes and arraignment or preliminary 
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hearing and then arraignment. The inclusion of this instruction 
could only act to confuse the jury and is thus unfairly 
prejudicial to the defendants. 
Defendants1 convictions should be reversed as a result of 
the court's error in giving the instruction described above. 
POINT IV 
THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT BY REMARKS DURING 
OPENINGSTATEMENT WHICH REFERRED TO EVIDENCE WHICH WAS 
INADMISSABLE. 
During the opening statement of the prosecutor, the 
prosecutor told the jury that the evidence of the State would 
include a statement from defendant Warwick to the sheriff that 
"We are not going through all that rigmarole."I!m guilty and I 
know it." (T.15) Counsel for the defendants objected to the 
statement and the court did not allow the prosecutor to make 
additional reference to it in his opening statement. However, 
the jury had already heard the damaging statement. During the 
trial, no evidence was ever allowed to be introduced as to any 
such statement by the defendant Warwick. 
Under the case law of the State of Utah, a prosecutor's 
comments warrant reversal if the comments called the jury's 
attention to matters the jury was not justified in considering, 
and the jurors were probably influenced by the comments. State 
v. Slowe, 728 P2d 110. 
There is no question as to the first issue. The statement 
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made to the jury about Warwick confessing to the crime was never 
admitted and the prosecutor should have known that in the joint 
trial such a statement would not be admissible under the Bruton 
case. 
As to the second issue, where the jury was out over three 
hours in deliberation, and there was a substantial question of 
the intent of the defendants since the cattle taken were on 
public lands and were unmarked or branded in any fashion, the 
effect of such a statement on a jury would be substantial. This 
situation is similar to the case of State v. West, 617 P2d 1298 
(Mont. 1980) in which the court found the prosecutor's recitation 
in his opening statement of heresay evidence connecting the 
defendant with the crime to be reversible error since the 
evidence was never allowed to be introduced. Also, in State v. 
wiswell, 639 P2d 146, the Utah Supreme Court found comments in 
the prosecutor's closing argument to the jury regarding the 
defendant's silence after being advised of his right to remain 
silent to amount to prosecutorial misconduct. The rights of co-
defendants to confrontation under the Bruton case and the 
Constitutions of the State of Utah and the United States are no 
less important and fundamental. 
Defendants' convictions should be reversed based upon the 
prosecutor's improper and prejudicial comments in opening 
statement. 
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POINT V 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE VERDICT 
Defendants contend that no evidence was introduced at trial 
from which the jury could have reasonably concluded beyond a 
reasonable doubt that defendants knew or should have known that 
the seven subject cattle in their possession were owned by A. C. 
Ekker, or anyone, or that the defendants were not operating under 
a mistake of fact as to actual ownership and therefore that the 
defendants had the necessary culpable state of mind, to wit, an 
intent to deprive anyone of his or her property. 
The undisputed facts of this case are that the three 
defendants were stopped by Wayne County Sheriff Kerry Ekker on 29 
August, 1987, in Mr. Hatch's truck which was pulling a goose-neck 
trailer loaded with seven head of cattle. The stop occurred near 
the Hans Flat Ranger Station in Wayne County. The three 
defendants had just passed through the boundaries of a grazing 
area or allotment to which the sheriff's cousin, A. C. Ekker, was 
the exclusive licensee. The allotment area consists of over 
200,000 acres, comprised mostly of federally owned and 
administered (BLM) range lands, the Glen Canyon National 
Recreation Area, and a small privately owned land locked portion. 
While A. C. Ekker owned exclusive license to graze cattle in the 
allotment, he did not have exclusive possession; rather, except 
for the small private portion all lands within the allotment were 
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and are open to public ingress and egress. The Sheriff later 
determined that all of the cattle were taken from the lands open 
to the public. 
A. C. Ekker's license provided for a year-round grazing 
within the allotment. His cattle remained on and ranged freely 
within the allotment for the entire year and were not routinely 
rounded up or moved to other summer or winter ranges. Such year-
round right is contrary to the usual grazing licence which 
provides for private grazing on the public land only during a 
part of each year. Ekkerfs year-round privilege is one of only 
three of such licenses in Utah. 
The Ekker operation was unique in addition to its year-round 
use of the public lands. His cattle were raised for sport and 
rodeo roping and not for beef. Consequently, the bulls were not 
castrated and their horns were not "tipped". This results in 
cattle with a stronger horn base which will result in stronger 
horns later that are more suitable to repeated roping and rough 
handling. The Ekker cattle were a longhorn cross-breed, not 
typical to other herds in the State. Because of the size of the 
allotment and the fact that the cattle live and breed there year-
round, and because they were not tended but lived their lives 
roaming year round on the allotment area, a portion of the cattle 
were never branded, earmarked, tattooed, or otherwise marked as 
to ownership. As A.C. Ekker testified: 
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Remember, it's rough canyon country, a lot of 
cedars and pinion forest and breaks and the cattle are 
hard to gather and they get wild. And, because we 
don't move from winter to summer, we never get a 
complete roundup. and a cow may grow up and be two, 
three, four years old before we ever get her in corral 
to brand her. We always brand them if we get them in a 
corral . . .On occasion, we'll let a bull or cow get 
away in order to wean a calf by catching it, tying it 
down, and going back in a trailer and getting it. So 
that's the reason for unbranded cattle. (Transcript of 
trail, page 104, line 10). 
The allotment area is bounded primarily by natural 
formations such as cliffs, rivers, and other geological 
formations. No signs mark the boundaries or otherwise give 
notice of the existence or parameters of the grazing area either 
along the various boundaries or at points where roads pass 
through such boundaries. The signs that do exist give direction 
and mileage to landmarks and other points of interest, springs, 
the Ekker family homestead, etc, as well as the entries into the 
Glen Canyon National Recreation Area. 
The cattle in the possession of defendants had no brands, 
earmarks, tattoos, or other indicators of ownership. None of the 
male cattle were castrated. The Sheriff's stop occurred during 
daylight. The cattle were being transported in an open-sided 
trailer with no tarps or other coverings. The Sheriff was able 
to recognize the unique breed of the cattle in the trailer from a 
distance of 1/2 to 3/4 of a mile. When stopped by the Sheriff 
the driver (Hatch) was asked who owned the cattle in the trailer. 
His reply was "I don't know." 
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Defendant Hatch testified that they never saw any 
identifying marks on any of the dozen or so cattle they saw 
during the day -- either from a distance or after close 
inspection, that they saw no salt licks, litter, tire tracks, or 
horse tracks, and that none of the cattle were tipped or 
castrated or appeared in any other way to be cared for, but 
appeared wild. Hatch testified that after spending many hours 
roping the cattle, the three parked their rig in the middle of 
the only road into the area with the cattle loaded in the trailer 
and napped for about four hours. He further testified that 
because of the lack of identifying marks, lack of signs of care, 
and the rough and remote territory in which the cattle were 
found, that they felt the cattle didn't belong to anyone but that 
"we thought they were ours when we caught them." (Transcript of 
trial, Page 172, Line 25). He testified that had there been any 
signs of ownership they would not have taken any of the animals. 
In recent decisions this Court and the Utah Supreme Court 
have each restated the standard of review of jury verdicts: 
[W]e review the evidence and all inferences which 
may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the verdict of the jury. We reverse a 
jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was convicted. State 
v. Lactod, 90 UAR 46 (Ct App 2, September, 1988), 
citing State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d at 1207. 
On appeal it is defendants burden to establish 
that the evidence at trail was so inconclusive or 
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insubstantial as to preclude the Jury from properly 
finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. 
Walker, 94 UAR 30 (4 November, 1988), citing State v, 
Kereckes, 622 P.2d 1161. 
In each of these decisions, the Courts have declared that it 
is not the reviewing court's duty to reweigh the evidence, 
rather, ff[s]o long as there is some evidence, including 
reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite 
elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." 
Lactod, supra, citing State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342. Also, 
Walker, supra, likewise citing Booker, supra. 
In this case, the evidence is undisputed that the subject 
cattle themselves bore no outward signs of ownership that should 
have been apparent to defendants, that the location and general 
appearance of the animals gave no additional indication of 
ownership except to those persons with special personal knowledge 
of A. C. Ekker's particular operation, and that the defendants 
did not attempt to conceal their activity. No direct evidence 
supported the jury's verdict. Further, without additional direct 
incriminating evidence, it was unreasonable for the jury to infer 
from the introduced evidence that the defendants were or should 
have been aware of the actual ownership of the animals. The 
conviction should be reversed for the reason that defendants have 
carried their burden of establishing that the evidence and 
reasonable inferences therefrom were so insubstantial that the 
jury could not have reasonably found the necessary culpable state 
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of mind, beyond a reasonable doubt. 
CONCLUSION 
The failure of the State to respond to the discovery 
requests of the defendants fully by revealing the alleged oral 
statements of two of the co-defendants resulted in prejudice to 
all of the defendants where they were being tried at a joint 
trial. The statements were in the nature of inculpatory 
admissions which should have been provided to the defendants. 
The failure of the trial court to prohibit evidence of said 
admissions at the time of trial resulted in prejudicial error. 
Further, the State also failed to give notice to defense 
following the discovery requests and partial compliance by the 
prosecutor of a witness known to the prosecutor and whom he 
intended to call. The court committed reversible error in 
allowing the witness to testify against the defendant despite the 
objections of counsel for defendants and the failure of the State 
to previously identify the witness to counsel to allow them to 
prepare to refute her testimony. 
Also the Court committed reversible error by giving an 
instruction concerning prohibited and unlawful conduct of which 
the defendants had never been charged. The giving of the 
instruction was prejudicial in that it created a greater risk of 
conviction of the defendants by the jury than had the instruction 
not been given. 
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Also, the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by 
quoting in his opening statement an alleged oral admission of one 
of the co-defendants. The admission referred to by the 
prosecutor was never allowed into evidence and under the cases 
governing such matters the prosecutor should have known that to 
comment on such an admission prior to its introduction on a joint 
trial would be prejudicial to the co-defendants. 
Finally, the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to 
support the verdict of the jury. The State has the burden of 
proof and there was not presented to the jury sufficient evidence 
upon which reasonable minds could find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendants had the intent to commit the crime of theft 
as set forth in the information-. 
Based upon the foregoing, the defendants respectfully 
submits that their convictions in this case should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this / — day of December, 1988. 
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